We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identi…ed by Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak pareto condition is imposed. Hence, under weak independence, both the Arrow (1951) and Wilson (1972) theorems vanish.
Introduction
We consider the preference aggregation problem in a society which confronts at least three alternatives. A Social Welfare Function (SWF) is a mapping which assigns a social ranking to any logically possible pro…le of individual rankings. A SWF is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if the social ranking of any pair of alternatives depends only on individuals'preferences over that pair. We know, since the seminal work of Arrow (1951) , that IIA and Pareto optimality are incompatible, unless one is ready to admit dictatorial SWFs.
The Arrovian impossibility is remarkably robust against weakenings of IIA.
1 For example, letting k stand for the number of alternatives that the society confronts, Blau (1971) proposes the concept of m-ary independence for any integer between 2 and k. A SWF is m-ary independent if the social ranking of any set of alternatives with cardinality m depends only on individuals'preferences over that set. Clearly, when m = 2, m-ary independence coincides with IIA. Moreover, every SWF trivially satis…es m-ary independence when m = k. It is also straighforward to see that m-ary independence implies n-ary independence when m < n. Nevertheless, Blau (1971) shows that m-ary independence implies n-ary independence when n < m < k as well. Thus, weakening IIA by imposing independence over sets with cardinality more than two does not allow to escape the Arrovian impossibility, unless independence is imposed over the whole set of alternatives -a condition which is satis…ed by the de…nition of a SWF. Kelly (2000, 2007) further weaken m-ary independence by requiring that the social preference over a pair of alternatives depends only on individuals' preferences over some proper subset of the set of available alternatives. This condition, which they call independence of some alternatives (ISA) is considerably weak. As a result, non-dictatorial SWF that satisfy Pareto optimality and ISA -such as the "gateau rules" identi…ed by Campbell and Kelly (2000) -do exist. On the other hand, "gateau rules"fail neutrality and as Campbell and Kelly (2007) later show, within the Arrovian framework, an extremely weaker version of ISA disallows both anonymity and neutrality. Denicolo (1998) identi…es a condition called relational independent deciseveness (RID). He shows that although IIA implies RID, the Arrovian impossibility prevails when IIA is replaced by RID. Baigent (1987) proposes a weakening of IIA which requires that the social decision between a pair of alternatives cannot be reversed at two distinct preference pro…les that admit the same individual preferences over that pair. We refer to this condition as quasi IIA.
2 Baigent (1987) shows that every Pareto optimal and quasi IIA SWF must be dictatorial in a sense which is close to the Arrovian meaning of the concept -hence a version of the Arrovian impossibility.
In brief, the literature which explores the e¤ects of weakening IIA on the Arrovian impossibility presents results of a negative nature. We revisit this literature in order to contribute by a positive result. We show that under the weakening proposed by Baigent (1987) , the Arrovian impossibility can be surpassed by dropping the Pareto condition: We characterize the class of quasi IIA SWFs and show that this is a fairly large class which is not restricted to SWFs where the decision power is concentrated on one given individual. In fact, this class contains SWFs that are both anonymous and neutral. This positive result prevails when a weak version of the Pareto condition is imposed.
Our …ndings pave the way to surpass the impossibility of Arrow (1951) . Moreover, we establish that there is no tension between quasi IIA and the transitivity of the social outcome. Thus, we also contrast the results of Wilson (1972) and Barberà (2003) who show that the Pareto condition has little impact on the Arrovian impossibility which is essentially a tension between IIA and the range restriction imposed over SWFs.
Section 2 presents the basic notions. Section 3 states our results. Section 4 makes some concluding remarks.
Basic Notions
We consider a …nite set of individuals N with #N 2, confronting a …nite set of alternatives A with #A 3. An aggregation rule is a mapping f : N ! where is the set of complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations over A while is the set of complete binary relations over A. We conceive P i 2 as the preference of i 2 N over A.
3 We write P = (P 1 ; :::; P #N ) 2 N for a preference pro…le and f (P ) 2 re ‡ects the social preference obtained by the aggregation of P through f . Note that f (P ) need not be transitive.
2 Note that when social indi¤erence is not allowed, IIA and quasi IIA are equivalent. 3 As usual, for any distinct x; y 2 A, we intepret x P i y as x being preferred to y in view of i.
Moreover, as f (P ) need not be antisymmetric, we write f (P ) for its strict counterpart. 4 An aggregation rule f is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) i¤ given any distinct x; y 2 A and any P; P 0 2 N with x P i y () x P 0 i y 8i 2 N , we have x f (P ) y () x f (P 0 ) y. We write for the set of aggregation rules which satisfy IIA. For any distinct x; y 2 A, let f x y ; y x ; xyg be the set of complete and transitive preferences over fx; yg. 5 An elementary aggregation rule is a mapping f fx;yg : f x y ; y x g N ! f x y ; y x ; xyg. Any family f = ff fx;yg g of elementary aggregation rules indexed over all possible distinct pairs x; y 2 A induces an aggregation rule as follows: For each P 2 N and each x; y 2 A,
6 Note that f = ff fx;yg g 2 . Moreover, any f 2 can be expressed in terms of a family ff fx;yg g = f of elementary aggregation rules.
Let < be the set of complete and transitive binary relations over A. A Social Welfare Function (SWF) is an aggregation rule whose range is restricted to <. A SWF : N ! < is Pareto optimal i¤ given any distinct x; y 2 A and any P 2 N with x P i y 8i 2 N , we have x (P ) y. A SWF : N ! < is dictatorial i¤ 9i 2 N such that x P i y implies x (P ) y 8P 2 N ; 8x; y 2 A: The Arrovian impossibility, as we consider, announces that a SWF : N ! < is Pareto optimal and IIA if and only if is dictatorial.
3 Results Baigent (1987) proves a version of the Arrovian impossibility where IIA and dictatoriality are replaced by their following weaker versions: A SWF is quasi IIA i¤ given any distinct x; y 2 A and any Baigent (1987) establishes that every Pareto optimal and quasi IIA SWF is a weak dictatorship. Nevertheless, we remark that, unlike the original version of the Arrovian impossibility, the converse statement is not true: Although every weak dictatorship is quasi IIA, there exists weak dictatorships that are 4 So for any distinct x; y 2 A, we have x f (P ) y whenever x f (P ) y and not y f (P ) x. 5 We interpret x y as x being preferred to y; y x as y being preferred to x; and xy as indi¤erence between x and y: 6 So for any i 2 N , we have P
not Pareto optimal. 7 Following this remark, we allow ourselves to the state a slight generalization of this theorem of Baigent (1987) :
Theorem 3.1 Within the family of Pareto optimal SWFs, a SWF : N ! < is quasi IIA i¤ a is weakly dictatorial.
We now explore the e¤ect of being con…ned to the class of Pareto optimal SWFs. The strict counterpart of T 2 is denoted T . Let : ! 2 < stand for the correspondence which transforms each T 2 over A into a non-empty subset of < such that (T ) = fR 2 < : xT y =) xRy; 8x; y 2 Ag: To have a clearer understanding of , we recall that every T 2 induces an ordered list of "cycles".
8 A set Y 2 2 A nf;g is a cycle (with respect to T 2 ) i¤ Y can be written as Y = fy 1 ; :::; y #Y g such that y i T y i+1 8i 2 f1; :::; #Y 1g and y #Y T y 1 . The top-cycle of X 2 2 A nf;g with respect to T 2 is a cycle C(X; T ) X such that y T x 8y 2 C(X; T ), 8x 2 XnC(X; T ).
9 Now let
Given the …niteness of A, there exists an integer k such that A k+1 = ;. So every T 2 induces a unique ordered partition (A 1 ; A 2 ; :::::; A k ) of A. It follows from the de…nition of the top-cycle that whenever i < j, we have xT y 8x 2 A i ; 8y 2 A j .
Lemma 3.1 Take any T 2 which induces the ordered partition (A 1 ; A 2 ; :::::; A k ).
Given any A i with no indi¤erences among alternatives and any x; y 2 A i ; we have x R y and y R x; 8R 2 (T ):
Proof. Take any T 2 which induces the ordered partition (A 1 ; A 2 ; :::::; A k ). Take any A i , any x; y 2 A i and any R 2 (T ):If #A i = 1; then x R y and y R x holds by the completeness of R. As #A i = 2 cannot hold we complete the proof by considering the case #A i = k 3: Let A i = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::::; x k g: Suppose, without loss of generality, x 1 R x 2 and not x 2 R x 1 : This implies x 1 T x 2 , as R 2 (T ). Moreover, as A i is a cycle with no indi¤erences, 9x 2 A i such that x 2 T x. Let, without loss of generality, x 2 T x 3 : Thus, x 2 R x 3 by de…nition of which implies x 1 R x 3 and not x 3 R x 1 by the transitivity of R. Again by the de…nition of , we have x 1 T x 3 : As A i is a cycle, 9j 2 f4; :::::; k 1g such that x 3 T x j : Suppose, without loss of 7 For example the SWF where x (P ) y 8x; y 2 A and 8P 2 N is a weak dictatorship but not Pareto optimal.
8 we use the de…nition of "cycle" as stated by Peris and Subiza (1999) . 9 The top-cycle, introduced by Good (1971) and Schwartz (1972) , has been explored in details. Moreover, Peris and Subiza (1999) extend this concept to weak tournaments. In their setting, as C(X; T ) is a cycle, @Y C(X; T ) with y T x 8y 2 Y , 8x 2 C(X; T )nY . generality, j = 4: So x 3 T x 4 , hence x 3 R x 4 , implying x 1 R x 4 and not x 4 R x 1 , which in turn implies x 1 T x 4 . So, iteratively, 8i 2 f4; ::::; k 1g; we have x i T x i+1 ;which implies x i R x i+1 and moreover x 1 R x i+1 and not x i+1 R x 1 : Hence, x 1 T x i+1 : As A i is a cycle, x k T x 1 : So, x k R x 1 by the de…nition of : Then, x i R x i+1 ; 8i 2 f2; 3; :::; k 1g and x k R x 1 implies by transitivity of R; x 2 R x 1 which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, x R y and y R x for all x; y 2 A i ; 8R 2 (T ): Thus for any T 2 which induces the ordered partition (A 1 ; A 2 ; :::::; A k ) and any R 2 <, we have R 2 (T ) if and only if for any x; y 2 A (i) x; y 2 A i for some A i =) xRy and yRx and (ii) x 2 A i and y 2 A j for some A i ; A j with i < j =) xRy. We now proceed towards characterizing the family of quasi IIA SWFs. Take any aggregation rule f 2 which satis…es IIA. By composing f with , we get a social welfare correspondence f :
< which assigns to each P 2 N a non-empty subset (f (P )) of <. Clearly, every singleton-valued selection of f is a SWF. 10 Let f = f : N ! < j is a singleton-valued selection of f g. We write = [ f 2 f . Interestingly, the class of quasi IIA SWFs coincides with :
Proof. To establish the "only if"part, let : N ! < be a quasi IIA SWF.
For any distinct x; y 2 A, we de…ne f fx;yg : f x y ; y x g N ! f x y ; y x ; xyg as follows:
For any r 2 f x y ; y x g N , f fx;yg (r) = x y if x a (P ) y for some P 2 N with P fx;yg = r y x if y a (P ) x for some P 2 N with P fx;yg = r xy if x a(P ) y and y a(P ) x for all P 2 N with P fx;yg = r .
As is quasi IIA, f fx;yg is well-de…ned. Thus f = ff fx;yg g 2 . We now show (P ) 2 (f (P )) 8P 2 N : Take any P 2 N and any distinct x; y 2 A.
First let x f (P ) y. So f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) = x y . By de…nition of f fx;yg , we have x a (Q) y for some Q 2 N with Q fx;yg = P fx;yg which implies x a(P ) y as is quasi IIA. If y f (P ) x, then one can similarly y a(P ) x. Now, let x f (P ) y and y f (P ) x: So, f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) = xy which, by de…nition of f fx;yg ; implies 10 We say that :
x a(Q) y and y a(Q) x for all Q 2 N with Q fx;yg = P fx;yg , hence x a(P ) y and y a(P ) x. Thus, x f (P ) y =) x a(P ) y for any x; y 2 A, establishing (P ) 2 (f (P )): To establish the "if" part, take any 2 . So there exists f 2 such that (P ) 2 (f (P )) 8P 2 N . Suppose is not quasi IIA. So, 9x; y 2 A and 9P; Q 2 N with P fx;yg = Q fx;yg such that x a (P ) y and y a (Q) x: By the de…nition of we have x f (P ) y and y f (Q) x which implies f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) = x y and f fx;yg (Q fx;yg ) = y x , giving a contradiction as P fx;yg = Q fx;yg , thus showing that is quasi IIA. By juxtaposing Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, one can conclude that removing the Pareto condition has a dramatic impact, as the class of quasi IIA SWFs is fairly large and allows those where the decision power is not concentrated on a single individual. This positive result prevails when the following weak Pareto condition is imposed: A SWF is weakly Pareto optimal i¤ given any distinct x; y 2 A and any P 2 N with x P i y 8i 2 N , we have x (P ) y. An aggregation rule f 2 is weakly Pareto optimal i¤ for any x; y 2 A and any r 2 f x y ; y x g N with r i = x y 8i 2 N , we have f fx;yg (r) 2 f x y ; xyg. Let stand for the set of weakly Pareto optimal and IIA aggregation rules and
Theorem 3.3 A SWF : N ! < is weakly Pareto optimal and quasi IIA i¤ a 2 :
Proof. To show the "only if" part, take any SWF : N ! < which is weakly Pareto optimal and quasi IIA. For any distinct x; y 2 A, we de…ne f fx;yg : f x y ; y x g N ! f x y ; y x ; xyg as follows: For any r 2 f x y ; y x g N , f fx;yg (r) = x y if x a (P ) y for some P 2 N with P fx;yg = r y x if y a (P ) x for some P 2 N with P fx;yg = r xy if x a(P ) y and y a(P ) x for all P 2 N with P fx;yg = r .
As is quasi IIA, f fx;yg is well-de…ned. Thus f = ff fx;yg g 2 . Suppose, f is not weakly Pareto optimal. So, 9x; y 2 A and 9P 2 N with x P i y 8i 2 N such that y f (P ) x, implying f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) = y x : By de…nition of f fx;yg , we have y a (Q) x for some Q 2 N with Q fx;yg = P fx;yg , contradicting that a is weakly Pareto optimal, which establishes f = ff fx;yg g 2 : We now show (P ) 2 (f (P )) 8P 2 N : Take any P 2 N and any distinct x; y 2 A.
First let x f (P ) y. So f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) = x y . By de…nition of f fx;yg , we have x a (Q) y for some Q 2 N with Q fx;yg = P fx;yg which implies x a(P ) y as is quasi IIA. If y f (P ) x, then one can similarly y a(P ) x. Now, let x f (P ) y and y f (P ) x: So, f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) = xy which, by de…nition of f fx;yg ; implies x a(Q) y and y a(Q) x for all Q 2 N with Q fx;yg = P fx;yg , hence x a(P ) y and y a(P ) x. Thus, x f (P ) y =) x a(P ) y for any x; y 2 A, establishing (P ) 2 (f (P )): To show the "if"part, take any a 2 : So there exists f 2 such that (P ) 2 (f (P )) 8P 2 N . Take any distinct x; y 2 A and any P 2 N with x P i y 8i 2 N: By the weak Pareto optimality of f; we have f fx;yg (P fx;yg ) 2 f x y ; xyg, hence x f (P ) y, which implies x a(P ) y by the de…nition of : Thus, a is weakly Pareto optimal. The "if"part of Theorem 3.2 establishes that is quasi IIA, completing the proof.
Concluding Remarks
Within the scope of the preference aggregation problem, we contribute to the understanding of the well-known tension between requiring the pairwise independence of the aggregation rule and the transitivity of the social preference. As Wilson (1972) shows, a SWF : N ! < is non-imposed 11 and IIA if and only if is dictatorial or antidictatorial 12 or null 13 . Thus, aside from these, any aggregation rule which is IIA allows non-transitive social outcomes. In case these outcomes are rendered transitive according to one of the prescriptions made by , we attain a SWF which fails IIA but satis…es quasi IIA. In fact, as Theorem 3.2 states, the class of quasi IIA SWFs coincides with those which can be attained through a selection made out of the social welfare correspondence obtained by the composition of a SWF that is IIA with . This can be interpreted as a positive result, as the class of quasi IIA SWFs is fairly rich and not restricted to those where the decision power is concentrated on one individual. In fact, this class contains SWFs that are both anonymous and neutral. Moreover, as Theorem 3.3 states, this positive result prevails when a weaker version of the Pareto condition is imposed. Thus, we can conclude that the transitivity of the social outcome can be achieved at a cost of reducing IIA to quasi IIA and compromising of the strenght of the Pareto condition -hence an escape from an impossibility of both the Arrow (1951) and Wilson (1972) type. 11 : N ! < is non-imposed i¤ for any x; y 2 A, there exists P 2 N with x (P ) y. 12 is anti-dictatorial i¤ 9i 2 N such that x P i y implies y (P ) x 8P 2 N ; 8x; y 2 A: 13 : N ! < is null i¤ x (P ) y 8x; y 2 A and 8P 2 N .
This escape imposes indi¤erence in social preference, as quasi IIA and IIA coincide otherwise. One can ask for minimizing this imposition. It is straightforward to see that given an aggregation rule f 2 , there exists a unique selection of f which minimizes the imposed indi¤erences in the social decision: Writing (A 1 ; A 2 ; :::::; A k ) for the ordered partition induced by f (P ) 2 at P 2 N , take (P ) 2 (f (P )) where x (P ) y 8x 2 A i and 8y 2 A j with i < j. On the other hand, an open question of interest is the choice of the (non-dictatorial) f that minimizes the imposed social indi¤erence. We conjecture, by relying on Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) , that this will be the pairwise majority rule.
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